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editorial | posted July 14, 2006 (web only)

Too High a Price

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With the spreading violence in Lebanon and Gaza, the Israeli doctrine of absolute security and massive retaliation--the notion that any attack or threat of attack on Israel will be met with a disproportionate response--is again proving counterproductive to Israel's own security as well as to the larger stability of the region. It makes no sense for Israel to destroy the civil infrastructure of the Palestinians and of Lebanon in response to the kidnapping of its soldiers, or to further weaken the capacity of the governments of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority while at the same trying to hold them accountable for the actions of groups and militias they cannot reasonably control. This collective punishment of the Palestinian and Lebanese people is not only inhumane and should be condemned but also leads to more radicalization and to more chaos.

That was the lesson of the Israeli siege of the Palestinian Authority in 2002, which severely weakened the PA's ability to govern, helping to pave the way for the political success of Hamas. And it will be the lesson of the increasing destruction of Lebanon. Indeed, the most likely casualty of the latest case of Israel's massive retaliation will be the fragile social peace and the democratically elected government in Lebanon. Ironically, the much-trumpeted Cedar Revolution, the only example of the success of the Bush doctrine that neoconservatives can still point to, could be brought down by the Likudnik policies of Israel that the neocons so champion. It took Lebanon more than twenty years to recover a degree of stability and civil peace after the last major incursion. How long will it take to recover from the unraveling of the stability that American and Israeli policies are helping to bring about?

It is now clear that the American and Israeli strategy of trying to isolate Hamas and Hezbollah on the one hand, and Syria and Iran on the other, have backfired. Would the situation in Gaza have gotten so out of hand if Israel, the United States and the European Union had tried to work with the democratically elected Hamas government from the outset? And would Hezbollah have felt the freedom to take the reckless action it took--the deplorable firing of rockets on Israeli civilians? As Juan Cole points out today on Informed Comment, "A Lebanon with no Syrian troops and Hizbullah in the government was inherently unstable. With Syria gone, Hizbullah filled a security vacuum and also was less restrained."

CONTINUED BELOW
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said that Syria has a special responsibility to resolve this crisis. But the whole thrust of American policy of the last two years has been to reduce unconditionally Syria's influence in Lebanon so as to leave Lebanon to the Lebanese. By what logic does the Administration now seek to hold Syria accountable for the reckless action of Hezbollah militia in southern Lebanon? As Cole suggests, the hasty unplanned departure of Syrian forces may have ironically given Hezbollah more freedom to act than before. A dialogue with Syria together with an effort to have a more careful planned disengagement of Syrian forces would have given the Lebanese government a better chance of establishing control over its sovereignty in southern Lebanon.

The big beneficiaries of American policy have been the more radical wings of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Iranians, who more and more look like the champions of the Palestinian people. The big losers are the so-called moderate Arab regimes, which again look helpless in the face of what is seen as Israeli aggression, and the moderate Israelis, Palestinians and Lebanese who hoped for some normalcy of life with the prospect of peace, especially when the Hamas leadership appeared to be moving toward recognition of Israel. The United States and the larger world, too, are losers, for no one benefits from this mindless escalation of violence, particularly at a time of growing sectarian violence in Iraq and rising oil prices.

The events of the past two weeks should remind us that the peace and stability of the region is too important to be left to Israel and to Washington. There is a need for much greater and more forceful UN and European Union involvement and for the kind of diplomacy that the Europeans and the UN conducted in the late 1980s and the early '90s that led to the mutual release of prisoners and eventually to the Oslo peace process. The UN Quartet--consisting of the UN, the United States, Russia and the EU--has been far too deferential to the Bush Administration's failed road map strategy, and it is time for more active and comprehensive G-8 and UN-led diplomacy. Secretary General Kofi Annan's dispatch of two representatives to the region is a start, but it must be followed up by G-8 and UN Security Council action to rein in forces on all sides. This diplomacy should be aimed first at establishing a cease-fire and a mutual prisoner exchange and second at recognizing Hamas in Palestine and establishing talks with Syria and Iran. The United States must urgently back this diplomacy as well as make clear to Israel that it cannot support its current military action. The price it will pay in Iraq and in the region as a whole for doing so is just too large.

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article | posted July 20, 2006 (web only)

Nasrallah's Game

Adam Shatz

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In January 2004 Sheik Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, presided over a major prisoner exchange with Israel, in which the Lebanese guerrilla movement and political party secured the release of more than 400 Arab prisoners in return for the bodies of three Israeli soldiers and an Israeli businessman and alleged spy, Elhanan Tannenbaum, whom Hezbollah had kidnapped. Moments before the exchange was sealed, Ariel Sharon withheld three Lebanese detainees, one of whom, Samir Kuntar, had killed a family of three in the Israeli town of Nahariya in 1979. Nasrallah, having failed to release Kuntar and the two other men, declared that Hezbollah would "reserve the right" to capture Israeli soldiers until the men were freed.

On July 12 Nasrallah launched the most daring assault of his tenure as Hezbollah's leader: the capture of two Israeli soldiers in a raid that left eight other Israeli soldiers dead. He called the attack "Operation Truthful Promise."

Nasrallah is not a man who minces words. Still, questions linger as to the timing and location of Operation Truthful Promise, which detonated Israel's most ruthless assault on Lebanon since the 1982 invasion. Although Hezbollah's operation was apparently planned five months in advance, it occurred amid the Israeli siege in Gaza, which followed the capture of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian guerrillas and was inevitably interpreted as a gesture of solidarity with the Gazans, particularly the Hamas leadership, dozens of whose members were recently abducted by Israel. What is more, Hezbollah did not strike in the occupied Shebaa Farms, a sliver of land in the Golan Heights, as it usually does, but inside Israel, a violation of international law that Israel--despite its own numerous violations of Lebanese territorial sovereignty--could invoke as a casus belli. In other words, Hezbollah undertook an audacious act of brinksmanship that was bound, if not designed, to escalate tensions with Israel.

CONTINUED BELOW
It is, of course, possible that Nasrallah regards the Jewish state as a paper tiger, and did not expect it to seize upon Hezbollah's raid as a pretext to pulverize his movement and to scrap the "rules of the game" that have governed the low-intensity conflict that Hezbollah and Israel have waged along the border since the latter's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. But this is to underestimate Nasrallah, a shrewd, calculating man who, as a careful reader of history, is fully aware of how Israel has responded in the past to cross-border attacks. Indeed, when I spoke to him at his (now leveled) headquarters in Beirut in October 2003, Nasrallah--sitting near a photograph of his son Hadi, who was killed in a clash with Israeli soldiers in 1997--seemed in no mood to ignite a war that would bring Israeli troops back to Lebanon. "When you get something by paying such a precious price, you are more keen on safeguarding it," he told me. "We will not accept anyone coming and squandering it. We are the sons of this soil, the sons of this country. We have no other place to go."

If Nasrallah knew that Operation Truthful Promise might provide the Israelis with an excuse to invade Lebanon, something that could--and, briefly, did--make Hezbollah the target of Lebanese rage (even, evidently, among some of his Shiite followers), what does he hope to achieve and what is his endgame? Why risk the future of his movement, which has a significant bloc in Lebanon's Parliament, a seat in the Cabinet and a vast network of social services and enterprises (the party is Lebanon's second-largest employer)? The devastation of Lebanon, and of Hezbollah strongholds formerly occupied by Israel, would seem a rather high price to pay for a few prisoners, particularly if Hezbollah ends up sharing the blame for the destruction of the country's tourism industry, the oxygen of its economy.

Nasrallah's objectives most likely lie elsewhere. Since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal ("the first Arab victory in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict," as Nasrallah often notes), Hezbollah has faced mounting pressure, from the West but also at home, to lay down its arms and become a purely political organization--a fate the party dreads, since it prides itself on being a vanguard of Islamic resistance to American and Israeli ambitions in the Middle East. This pressure dramatically intensified with UN Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), which called for the disbanding of all Lebanese militias, and with the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon last year. By conducting a raid that was likely to provoke a brutal Israeli reprisal, Nasrallah may have gambled that the fury of the Lebanese would soon turn from Hezbollah to the Jewish state, thereby providing a justification for "the national resistance" as Lebanon's only deterrent against Israel. So far, Israel (with the full support of the Bush Administration) has played right into his hands, inflicting more than 300 casualties, nearly all of them civilians, and pounding the civilian infrastructure, eliciting sympathy for Hezbollah even among some Lebanese Christians. By striking at Israel's Army during its most destructive campaign in Palestine since 2002's "Operation Defensive Shield," Nasrallah must have known that he would earn praise throughout the Muslim world for coming to the aid of Palestinians abandoned by the region's authoritarian governments, a number of which have pointedly chastised Nasrallah's "adventurism." And by bloodying Israel's nose, Hezbollah could once again bolster its aura in the wider Arab world as a redoubtable "resistance" force, a model it seeks to promote regionally, especially in Palestine, where Nasrallah is a folk hero, and in Iraq, where Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the radical Shiite Mahdi Army, has proclaimed himself a follower of Hezbollah and has threatened to renew attacks against US forces in solidarity with the Lebanese.

Operation Truthful Promise was also, in part, a service rendered to Hezbollah's patrons in Damascus and Tehran, whether or not Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were consulted beforehand. The Syrian President warned former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, in their last meeting before Hariri's assassination, that if he pushed for Syria's withdrawal Assad would "break" Lebanon. With Hezbollah's raid, Assad may have found a way to get Israel to break Lebanon for him--a wish that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz were more than happy to fulfill. Damascus may be facing renewed threats, but Assad can now bask in Nasrallah's glow without directly engaging the Israeli military, which, as he knows, is divided on whether to depose him (since the only realistic alternative to the secular Baath regime is the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood); Lebanese anger has been redirected from Syria back to Israel; Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora looks on helplessly as the Israelis strafe his country; and the West has been warned that Lebanon will remain fractured, volatile and incapable of controlling its borders unless Syria's interests (particularly in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights) are taken into account. President Ahmadinejad, for his part, can thank Nasrallah for diverting attention from the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, and for burnishing the Islamic republic's reputation as a staunch defender of Palestinian rights--and, not least, of Muslim Jerusalem--in a region whose other (largely Sunni Arab) governments have compromised with the enemy. And the spectacular display of Hezbollah's Iranian-made weaponry, which have reached further into Israel than even the Israelis feared, and of the group's sophistication in deploying them, have reminded Israel and the United States of the "surprises" (Nasrallah's word) in store in the event of an attack on Iran.

Nasrallah is under no illusions that his small guerrilla movement can defeat the Israeli Army. But he can lose militarily and still score a political victory, particularly if the Israelis continue visiting suffering on Lebanon, whose government, as they well know, is powerless to control Hezbollah. Nasrallah, whom the Israelis attempted to assassinate on July 19 with a twenty-three-ton bomb attack on an alleged Hezbollah bunker, is doubtless aware that he may share the fate of his predecessor, Abbas Musawi, who was killed in an Israeli helicopter gunship attack in 1992. But Hezbollah outlived Musawi and grew exponentially, thanks in part to its followers' passion for martyrdom. To some, Nasrallah's raid may look like a death wish. But it is almost impossible to defeat someone who has no fear of death.

 

about

Adam Shatz has been the literary editor of The Nation since 2003. He has worked at the New York Times Book Review, Lingua Franca and The New Yorker. Shatz is the editor of Prophets Outcast: A Century of Dissident Jewish Writing About Zionism and Israel (Nation Books).He also edited Lingua Franca's book reviews and has reported from Lebanon and Algeria for the New York Review of Books. Shatz has contributed numerous articles on politics, music and culture to The Nation, The New York Review of Books, the Village Voice, American Prospect and the New York Times.

 

 


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Le Monde diplomatique - English edition

July 2006

 

Middle East in crisis
Lebanon: the other Palestinians

 

As the world focuses its attention on the grave crisis in Lebanon and Gaza (see “A long week in Gaza City”), which risks being transformed into a regional conflict, it is time to listen to the Palestinians in Lebanon - in particular those still living in the refugee camps.

By Marina Da Silva

The current crisis in Lebanon has revived the debate about disarming Hizbullah and returned attention to the Palestinians, who mostly live in Lebanon’s refugee camps, forgotten by history and left out of negotiations. Now they are being pushed to the centre of the political stage and are trying to assert a right of return which they have never renounced.

Khadda, who lived in the biggest camp in Lebanon, Ein al-Hilweh, on the edge of Saida, so dreaded the tensions and armed conflicts in it that she left the camp, risking the cohesion of her family. Her husband, who runs a small shop, has stayed, and her children go back every weekend. She said: “The refugee camps, and Ein al-Hilweh in particular, are always described in the national and international press as no-go areas that harbour criminals and Islamic extremists. But we are the camp, more than 45,000 of us, and we cherish our identity and our history. It’s not those tearaways, at most a couple of hundred, who are the products of insecurity and political stalemate.” Even more than the violence, Khadda is weary of the sense of suffocation, of the poverty clearly visible in the narrow, filthy streets and crumbling houses, fertile ground for Islamic radicalisation.

The turning point came in 1982 with Israel’s invasion and the forced departure of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its fighters. The PLO had provided work for nearly 65% of the Palestinians, as well as funding for health and education (also open to destitute Lebanese). Lebanon’s Palestinians then felt forgotten by the Oslo agreements of 1993: the PLO concentrated its diplomatic efforts on the West Bank and Gaza, which also received international aid. The budgets allocated to Lebanon by international NGOs, Unrwa (1) and other UN agencies were drastically reduced. The refugee camps that bore the brunt of war and economic hardship have been passed over.

The Islamist movements, mainly Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), have touched the poorest sections of the population by providing much-needed aid. Hamas benefited from popular anger after Israel deported 415 Palestinians close to the movement from the occupied territories to southern Lebanon in December 1992; Hamas benefited again when Israel began targeted assassinations of Palestinian Islamist political leaders: Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in March 2004 and Abdelaziz al-Rantissi a month later, both in Gaza. Their portraits are everywhere. Hamas’s victory in the Palestinian elections in January has added to its strength.

Um Fadi, who is close to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was surprised “like everyone else” at the Hamas victory, but she was pleased with the result, a vote “against corruption and for Palestinian rights, including the right of return”. Ein al-Hilweh is not like it was when her children were born there: in those days the camps were the symbol of Palestinian political life and of building a society in exile. “Today,” she said, “the population is hostage to political factions settling internal scores. Often there are deaths and people are afraid. But they don’t want to leave, because the camp still symbolises our long wait for return and the struggle for our rights.”

On 1 May a member of Fatah was killed by a militant member of Usbat al-Ansar (League of Partisans), a Salafist group thought to have links with al-Qaida. The death was the latest in a long list of casualties. These confrontations, political as much as criminal, often go beyond internal rivalries: they are part of a strategy of tension orchestrated by the various organisations’ secret services and meant to confuse. Ein al-Hilweh retains its symbolic status as a political camp where all Palestinian parties are recognised and respected, a real capital of the Palestinians in exile.

Sensitive situation

“The situation is sensitive,” said Abu Ali Hassan, a former leader of Ein al-Hilweh who is now at Mar Elias, a small, mainly Christian camp in Beirut, where he is in charge of relations with the Lebanese political parties. “The disarmament of the Palestinian organisations, called for by resolution 1559 of September 2004, at the instigation of France and the United States, constitutes one of the issues in Lebanese political life (2). The national unity government in Beirut has formed a committee to negotiate the disarmament of the bases outside the camps and control the arms inside them. We’re working towards creating a united delegation and ensuring that this issue isn’t dealt with just from a security point of view, but that the outcome will advance our political rights and improve the humanitarian situation in the camps.”

Abbas Zaki, from Fatah, heads the PLO representation in Jnah, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. He believes that its reopening in May was a strong political signal: “The government doesn’t want to deal with this issue by force; it’s mainly armed Palestinians in a dozen bases spread out across the Beqaa valley and in the coastal town of Nahme, 15km south of Beirut, who cause problems.” The statement by Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, in Paris last October, that Palestinians living in Lebanon had to “obey the law” and that they were there as “guests” was not welcomed.

Lebanese newspapers regularly report infiltrations of Palestinian militants from Syria into the western Beqaa, which have led the Lebanese army to seal off some 40 illegal crossing points between the countries and to tighten its control of Palestinian factions that are linked to pro-Syrian organisations based in Damascus, such as the PFLP-GC, Fatah-Intifada (a splinter group of Fatah, led by Abu Musa) and Al-Saiqa (the Palestinian wing of the ruling Ba’ath party in Syria).

“Because we’ve led the armed resistance to Israel and are still active and influential, we’re seen as obstacles to peace”, said Nabil, who heads the people’s committee in the camp at Beddawi, below Tripoli, in the north. Beddawi has less crowded houses, rebuilt roads and sewers, and is further away from the battle zone. It might seem peaceful, but to Nabil ,war remains a threat: “Israeli planes still fly regularly over Lebanon, north to south and back again, with total impunity. Sabra and Shatila will remain forever in our memory. We were massacred while we were under the protection of international forces. The arms in the camps are there to ensure our protection” (3).

The arms question conceals the Palestinians’ living conditions and their banishment. According to Unrwa’s March figures, there are 404,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, of whom 220,000 live in a dozen camps around the country. These include: in Beirut, Mar Elias, Burj al-Barajneh, Sabra and Shatila, and Dbayeh; in the south, near Saida, Ein al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh; also in the south, near Tyre, al-Buss, Rashidieh, Burj al-Shemali; in the north by Tripoli, Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi; and Wavel in the Beqaa valley. There are also small illegal ghetto-camps, not recognised by Unrwa and therefore without aid.

The Lebanese army keeps up pressure around the camps, particularly those in the south which provide shelter for some 100,000 refugees; access to these is restricted and requires a permit.

Fatah remains the most powerful organisation here, while in the camps in Beirut, northern Lebanon and the Beqaa, the pro-Syrians have maintained a significant presence. Everywhere the increasing strength of the Islamist movements is noticeable: some think it now puts Fatah and Hamas on an equal footing.

According to Unrwa, 60% of Palestinian refugees live in poverty and as many as 70% are unemployed. Until recently there were 72 jobs they were unable to practise outside the camps; they were not allowed to bring construction material into the camps; and they cannot leave or re-enter Lebanese territory without a visa, which lasts for only six months.

In June 2005 the Lebanese minister of labour, Trad Hamade, who is close to Hizbullah, signed a memorandum in favour of Palestinians born in Lebanon and registered at the interior ministry, which partly lifts the ban on doing certain jobs. But this does not change anything for qualified Palestinians, who still cannot practise medicine, law or architecture. There is total silence about a 2001 law that forbade Palestinians to buy houses or property in Lebanon, which has led to legal confusion, particularly on inheritance.

Samira Salah heads the PLO’s department for Palestinian refugee affairs and coordinates the campaign for the rights of refugees in Lebanon and the right of return, in accordance with UN resolution 194. She sees Hamade’s measures as a step forward, though they will not change anything in real terms: “Proposals were already made in 1995 indicating that a Palestinian born in Lebanon had the right to work, on condition he had a permit; but this permit is still almost impossible to obtain and the minister’s proposal doesn’t include social security or insurance.”

The campaign for Palestinian rights was started in April 2005 by a collective that brings together 25 Palestinian associations, the Palestine National Council, the PLO’s refugee affairs department and members of civil society. The campaign includes workshops and training, and seeks to gain the support of the Lebanese population to create a broad movement of political pressure. Under the slogan “Civil rights until we return; together with the Lebanese we will resist settlement and naturalisation of refugees”, the campaign has four main demands: the right to work, to own property, to security and to free association. These are not new but they have never been answered.

There are now some 4 million refugees, about 60% of the Palestinian community, who were originally forced into exile in their hundreds of thousands when the state of Israel was created; 90% live in the Palestinian territories and neighbouring Arab countries. Lebanon’s Palestinians crystallise the most sensitive issues in both Lebanese and regional politics. They are a reminder that any move in the Arab-Israeli conflict is linked to a resolution of the refugee problem.


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balmas 2006-07-24 03:10   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
"There are now some 4 million refugees, about 60% of the Palestinian community ..."
 

 

 

사실상 學位 장사 … 학부보고서만 못한 논문 수두룩
동향 : 특수대학원 난립으로 제살 깎아먹는 대학

2006년 07월 19일   이민선 기자 이메일 보내기

“특수대학원 문제점이야 수두룩하죠. 그런데 그게 하루 이틀 된 문제는 아니잖아요.”


ㄷ대의 신 아무개 교수가 말하듯 특수대학원이 부실하게 운영되고 있다는 것은 이제 공공연한 비밀이 됐다. 짧은 기간 우후죽순처럼 설립되고, 그 강의실에서 벌어지는 풍경을 보다보면 애초 존립 이유조차 알 수 없을 지경이다.


지난 3월 교육인적자원부 대학원개선팀이 내놓은 ‘대학원 교육관련 참고자료’에 따르면 2000년도부터 2004년도까지 특수대학원의 수는 1백50개교가 늘어났다. 2000년 6백42곳, 2001년 6백87곳, 2002년 7백27곳, 2003년 7백70곳, 2004년 7백92곳이었다. 특수대학원의 대폭적인 증가는 사립대가 주도해, 2000년 사립대 특수대학원은 5백25개교였으나, 2004년에는 6백59개교로 모두 1백34개 증가했다. 즉, 지난 4년간 늘어난 특수대학원 중 89.3%가 사립대가 설립한 것이다.

특수대학원, 4년 동안 150개교 설립돼

특수대학원 학사관리가 제대로 되지 않는다는 사실은 더 이상 숨길 일도 아니다. 예컨대 ㅅ대 행정대학원에 다니는 최 아무개 변호사처럼 한 학기에 두 번 출석하고서도 버젓이 B학점을 받아가는 사례는 양반에 속한다.


물론 최근 들어 수도권 일부 대학에서는 출석을 강화하고 상대평가제를 도입하는 등 강력하게 학사관리를 한다고 주장하지만, 교수가 대필 보고서를 알면서도 모르는 척해주는 ‘관행’은 여전히 남아 있는 것으로 확인됐다. 예컨대 3년 전 50만원을 받고 ㄱ대 경영대학원에 재학 중인 어느 기업 임직원의 중간 보고서를 대필해준 적이 있다는 ㄱ대 김 아무개 씨는 “그 다음 학기에 또 다른 ‘고객’을 대신해 똑같은 보고서를 동일한 교수에게 제출했지만 아무런 일도 발생하지 않았다”고 말한다.


ㅇ대 교육대학원에서는 논문 주심을 시간강사가 맡기도 한다. 이 대학에 지리학과가 없다는 이유로 ㄱ대 지리학과 시간강사가 논문 주심이 되는 것. 강사의 실력여부를 떠나 전임강사도 아닌 이가 논문 주심을 맡는 것에 대해 학생들은 불쾌하고 있었다.


이런 현실은 근본적으로는 특수대학원의 모호한 정체성에서 비롯되는 측면이 있다. 고등교육법 시행령 제21조에 따르면 특수대학원은 ‘직업인 또는 일반 성인을 위한 계속 교육을 주된 교육 목적으로 하는 대학원’. 하지만 ‘전문직업분야 인력의 양성에 필요한 실천적 이론의 적용과 연구개발을 주된 교육목적으로 하는’ 전문대학원과는 무슨 차이가 있는지 모르겠다. 특수대학원이 설립된 분야 대부분이 전문직업분야인 것을 감안한다면 말장난에 불과해 보인다. 또 각 대학에 설립된 평생교육원과도 별 차이가 없다.


특수대학원의 정체성에 대해서는 교육인적자원부에서도 헷갈려한다. 차이를 물어보는 질문에 교육부 관계자는 머뭇거리며 ‘학위 과정의 차이’라고 답변했다. 특수대학원에서는 석사학위 과정밖에 없지만 전문대학원은 박사학위 과정까지 설치할 수 있다는 게 두 대학원의 정체성을 판가름 짓는 요소라는 것이다.


특수대학원이 전문대학원과 평생교육원 사이에 어정쩡하게 걸쳐있으면서 대학과 교육 수요자 사이에서는 묘한 거래가 성립됐다. 대학 입장에서는 전문대학원보다는 ‘쉽게’ 가르치면서도 돈을 벌 수 있고, 학생입장에서는 돈만 있다면 ‘쉽게’ 배우고 학위도 얻어갈 수 있다는 인식이 자연스레 생겨났다. ㅇ대 행정대학원에서 수업을 맡았던 김 아무개 교수는 “내 수업만 해도 청와대 사무관, 소규모 기업체 사장, 지역신문 사장, 경찰간부, 기초의회 의원 등이 있는데 전문지식에 대한 갈망도 있지만, 정계진출을 위한 학력세탁을 원하는 경우가 많은 것 같다”고 말한다.

연예인 언론대학원 입학시켜 대학홍보

ㅈ대 언론대학원은 또 다른 사례. 언론인이나 기업체 홍보실 직원 정도만이 입학할 것이라는 예상과 달리 인기 연예인이 자주 입학하는 대학원으로 유명하다. ㅈ대에서 강의를 했던 김 아무개 교수는 “인기 연예인이 입학해 대학을 홍보하려는 효과를 노린 것”이라고 지적한다. 수도권의 ㄱ대 언론대학원 역시 초창기에 당시 인기 영화배우였던 강 아무개 씨를 입학시키며 호텔에서 정기적으로 조찬강연회를 연 것도 같은 맥락이라고 덧붙인다.


이런 상황에서 애초부터 ‘직업인의 재교육’이 들어 설 자리는 없고, ‘늙은 학생’들의 진학 이유가 불순해질 수밖에 없는 것은 당연하다. 국내 굴지의 통신업체 홍보실에서 근무하는 어느 관계자는 “언론대학원이나 경영대학원 진학이유가 공부보다는 학생들 사이의 ‘관계’를 맺기 위해서라는 점은 부인할 수 없다”고 말한다.


결국 대학들이 특수대학원의 취지를 망각하면서 무책임한 학위 논문이 남발됐다. ㅈ대 교육대학원 논문 중 김 아무개 씨가 제출한 ‘도덕과 수업의 평가에 관한 연구’의 경우, 34편의 참고문헌 중 선행연구 정리 차 참조할 수밖에 없는 학위논문이 단 한편도 없었다. 문제는 학부생의 보고서만도 못한 이 같은 학위논문이 소수가 아닌 다수를 차지한다는 점이다.


부수적인 영향이지만 특수대학원에 전임강사급 이상의 인력이 거의 배치되지 않은 채 부실하게 운영되면서 일반대학원 교육에까지 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. ㅅ대 정 아무개 교수는 “교수 한 명이 일반대학원, 특수대학원까지 포함해 30명 정도의 학생을 지도하는 경우도 있는데, 일반대학원 학생까지 피해를 볼 수밖에 없다”며, 대학 측의 인식전환이 필요하다고 강조했다.

 이민선 기자 dreamer@kyosu.net


©2006 Kyosu.net
Updated: 2006-07-19 09:28
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Mephistopheles 2006-07-22 10:01   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
어디 대학원 뿐인가요... 대학도 마찬가지잖아요....
들어가긴 어려워도 졸업하기 쉬운 대학....

balmas 2006-07-24 19:46   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
음, 그런 측면이 있죠.
 

 

 

베끼기와 짜깁기의 미학(?) … 자기표절 용인 관행이 더 문제
특별취재 : 학술지 중복투고 및 자기표절 사례, 그 두번째

2006년 07월 22일   최장순 기자 이메일 보내기

교수신문이 지난호(제407호, ‘교내학술지 그대로 등재지 게재…심사기준 모호’)에 이어, 인문·사범·사회과학 계열의 논문을 살펴본 결과, 또 다시 자기표절을 통해 연구업적을 부풀리는 사례가 포착됐다. 계간지에 게재됐던 글이 연구소 논문으로 당당히 실리는가 하면, 교내 학술지에 실렸던 여러 편의 논문이 합성된 채 한편의 외부 학술 논문으로 둔갑한 사례도 있었다. 또 동일한 내용과 결론의 ‘도플갱어’ 논문이 다른 학술지에서 발견되기도 했다. 이 같은 글쓰기에 대한 학적·도덕적 몰이해는 정직하게 연구하는 학자들에게까지 여파를 미쳐 글쓰기 윤리에 대한 심각한 반성을 요한다. / 편집자주

포스트모던 담론 속에서 ‘몸의 정치학’을 공부해본 사람이라면, ‘데카르트, 들뢰즈, 푸코의 육체’라는 ㅇ 교수의 논문을 접해봤을 것이다. 이는 서울 소재 ㅅ대의 ㅇ 교수가 1997년 6월 ‘사회비평’(제 17호)를 통해 발표했던 논문이다.


이 논문은 8년 후 ‘데카르트, 푸코, 들뢰즈의 육체’라는 제목의 ‘특집논문’(‘성평등연구’ 9집)으로 등장한다. 원논문을 기준으로 볼 때, 각 절의 순서가 뒤바뀌어 있고, 몇 개의 구절이 변화된 후, 약간의 새로운 내용이 삽입돼 완성된 논문이다.


‘자기표절’ 의혹에 대해 ㅇ 교수는 “연구업적에 포함시키지도 않았으며, 가톨릭대성평등연구소에서 예전 것을 토대로 고쳐 발표해달라는 부탁에 개인적으로 발표만 했던 것”이라고 해명했다.


이에 이영자 가톨릭대성평등연구소장(정치사회학)은 “우리 연구소에서 관례상 학술제 발표문을 제작했던 것”이며 “학술지로 나오는 것을 ㅇ 교수는 몰랐을 것”이라고 전했다. 또 이 소장은 “ㅇ 교수는 업적평가를 목적으로 한 게 아니어서 잘못이 없다”고 설명했다.

하지만, 이와 관련해 익명을 요구한 한 교수는 “담론의 생산성을 위한 건전한 과학 공동체 정신에 입각해 곱씹어 볼 때, 이러한 상황은 담론의 생산성을 떨어뜨려 바람직하지 않다”고 전했다.

본인 논문 베끼고 출처도 안 밝혀

또 다른 서울 소재 ㅅ대의 ㅇ 교수는 연구년 기간에 작성한 ‘우리나라 교육과정학 연구 동향에 관한 역사적 비판’을 2001년 6월, 등재후보지인 ‘교육과정연구’에 투고했다.


하지만, 이 논문에는 3개월 전 ‘한국의 학술연구’(논문모음 단행본)에 실렸던 ‘교육과정 및 교육공학’의 내용 중 2장 ‘교육과정 연구의 네 가지 패러다임’이 버젓이 게재돼 있었다.


이 부분은 앞 논문의 3장 ‘교육과정학 연구의 주요 접근들’에 그대로 들어가 있는데, 이 내용은 또 다시 2003년 8월 발표된 ‘교육과정학 이론 수립의 현황과 발전전망’(‘사회교육과학연구’ 제7권)에 무단 복제된 것으로 드러났다.


물론, 중복적으로 발견되는 이 내용들에 대해서는 어떠한 인용 표시도 없어 논문 작성자의 도덕 불감증을 여실히 보여주고 있다.


이러한 자기 표절을 통해 업적을 부풀린 ㅇ 교수는 이러한 지적에 대해 “아이디어를 발전시키는 과정에서 나온 논문이라 아무 문제없다”고 호언했다.


이번에 살펴본 결과 많은 학자들이 기존 연구에서 한 챕터를 통째로 옮겨오거나, 논문화하지 않았지만 책에 이미 실었던 내용을 필요에 따라 두 개의 章을 뭉치는 방식으로 논문을 만들어내고 있었다. 물론 출처를 밝히고 있었지만, 이런 식의 글쓰기가 바람직하지 않은 것은 분명하다.


강원도 소재 ㅊ대의 ㅊ 교수는 ‘인문사회교육연구’(6권)에 실린 자신의 논문 ‘학교 통일교육의 평화교육적 접근’의 50% 이상을 ‘통일교육에서 평화교육적 접근의 타당성’(통일문제연구 제39호)에 중복 게재했다.


2장 1절 ‘평화의 개념’, 2절 ‘평화실현을 위한 전략’이 추가된 것과 몇 개의 바꿔쓰기(paraphrasing)를 제외하면 논리의 전개방식이나 결론에 있어서 동일한 수준에 머무르고 있다. 게다가 ㅊ 교수는 ‘학교 통일교육의 평화교육적 접근’ 102쪽에 담긴 내용을 113~114쪽과 122쪽(결론부)에 걸쳐 두 번이나 표절하고 있어, 논의의 생산성마저 떨어뜨리는 결과를 초래했다.

‘조립형’, ‘통합형’ 자기복제도 적발돼

이러한 지적에 ㅊ 교수는 “첫 번째 것은 선배 교수의 정년퇴임 기념논문용으로 급하게 제출한 것이고, 두 번째는 앞의 논문을 수정·보완해 등재지에 게재한 것”이라며 “해당 학회지에서는 아무런 언급이 없었다”고 전했다. 이어 그는 “문제시된다면 업적 목록에서 삭제하겠다”고 말했다.

이러한 사례와 관련해 권오국 평화문제연구소 책임연구원은 “주제와 내용이 서로 다른 다양한 논문들이 한꺼번에 쏟아져 실질적으로 자기표절 여부를 확인하기 어려운 실정”이라며 “인문사회계열의 경우 학술지 간의 교차 확인 시스템이 전혀 갖춰져 있지 않다”고 애로사항을 털어놓았다. 이어 그는 “텍스트들이 지속적으로 DB화되고 있어, 다양한 학술지를 교차 확인할 수 있는 기회가 점점 넓어질 것”이라고 전망했다.

이에 더해 여러 편의 연구논문을 한 편으로 묶어내는 ‘조립형’, ‘통합형’ 자기표절 사례도 적발됐다.

2주만에 3만원짜리 심사?

경북 소재 ㅇ대의 ㄱ 교수의 경우가 그렇다. 그는 3년에 걸쳐 ‘홉스의 인간관과 정치체제관과의 인과관계’(사회과학논총, 2000), ‘로크의 인간관과 정치체제관과의 인과관계’(사회과학논총, 2001), ‘루소의 인간관과 정치체제관과의 인과관계’(사회과학논총, 2002)를 발표한 바 있으며, 이후 이 세 논문의 교차편집을 통해 또 다른 논문을 발표한 것으로 밝혀졌다. ‘홉스, 로크, 루소의 인간관과 정치체제관과의 인과관계 비교연구’(사회과학연구, 2004)가 그것.


물론, ㄱ 교수 스스로 서론의 말미에서, 상기 세 편의 논문이 선행작업으로 이뤄졌다고 밝히고 있으나, 마지막 ‘종합’ 논문에는 그 세 편이 거의 동일하게 발췌·복제돼 있어, ‘업적 부풀리기용’이라는 비난을 면키 어렵게 됐다.


이에 대해 ㄱ 교수는 “내 논문을 인용했기에 인용표시를 하지 않았고, 단지 시리즈물로서 기획한 것일 뿐”이라고 언급했으나, 예전의 논문들을 90%이상 있는 그대로 발췌·합성한 것이 과연 시리즈의 원래 개념에 부합하는 지 의문이다.


해당 학술지의 한 관계자는 “일부 인용을 하는 정도가 아니라 상당 부분을 그대로 인용한다는 것은 문제”라고 말하면서도 “이런 사태가 있어도 별도의 제재 규정이 마련돼 있지 않은 상황”이라고 어려움을 호소했다.


자기논문 복제 생산이 끊이지 않는 것은 효율성이 떨어지는 논문 심사제도와 논문수로 학자의 자질을 평가하는 정량적 업적평가제 탓이라는 주장이 계속 제기되고 있다.


이희재 안동대 교수(무역학)는 “논문 한 편을 심사하는데 2주의 시간이 주어지고 심사비도 3만원밖에 안되는 학술지가 더러 있다”고 말하는데, 상황이 이러하다면 심사위원들의 책임감 결여가 야기돼 엄밀한 심사가 어렵게 될 것이다. 심사과정 자체에 한계가 노정돼 있어 비양심적 논문 투고자들이 발생할 수도 있다는 것이다.


김진수 서경대 교수(유럽어학부)는 “이러한 정량평가가 학문별 특성과 차이를 무시하고 있으며, 등재지에 논문을 게재하지 못하면 게으른 교수로 낙인찍히는 게 현실”이라고 전했다. 이어 김 교수는 “좋은 논문, 좋은 번역은 수년치 업적으로 인정해주는 식의 파격적 평가방안 마련이 시급”하다고 주장했다.

 최장순 기자 che@kyosu.net


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자꾸때리다 2006-07-22 22:16   좋아요 0 | 댓글달기 | URL
롤랑 바르트의 문학 이론에 충실하군요.ㅋㅋㅋ 심오한 지적 탐구의 결과인 듯 합니다.

작가들이란 이미 씌어진 문장들을 뒤섞거나 재결합하거나 재배치시키는 능력 밖에 없는 사람들이다.